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1The IDC is a global information technology research
and advisory firm.
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
BUSINESSES IN SWEDEN
Dennis Prieto
Introduction 
In 2002 Sweden was ranked as one of the
most innovative countries by the Global
Competitiveness Report as well as the most
knowledge-based economy by the IDC.1 Given
this, one would think that Sweden would be at
the forefront of entrepreneurial activity.
However, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
consistently ranks Sweden in the bottom quar-
tile when comparing its level of entrepreneur-
ial activity to those of thirty-six other countries
which are developed or in advanced develop-
ment stages. I suggest that the causes of this
are twofold: cultural adverseness to entrepre-
neurship in the past half century and burden-
some government policies imposed on small
and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
According to modern economic growth
theory, increases in productivity and econom-
ic prosperity are a result of innovation and 
technological progress. (“High Tech SMEs...,”
p. 11) The dearth of small and medium-sized
businesses, which are usually the engines of
innovation, in Sweden has had a number of
negative consequences. For one thing, there is
greater volatility in the labor market since the
labor force has to depend primarily on the
country’s large corporations for private-sector
employment. Many of these large corporations
have been acquired or merged with foreign
competitors, and many of the jobs eliminated
have been in Sweden. For instance, the merg-
er between Astra and Zeneca displaced 11 per-
cent of the firm’s Sweden-based R&D workers.
(“AstraZeneca to Revamp...,” p. A22) As one can
see, the country is losing major sources of
employment; and due to the difficulties
involved in developing SMEs within Sweden,
there are few firms large enough to serve as
alternate sources of employment. 
This article will discuss some of the eco-
nomic implications of the small number of
SMEs in Sweden and several major impedi-
ments to their development. First, I explore the
problems associated with low levels of entre-
preneurship. Secondly, I demonstrate that the
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government is, in large part, responsible for
reducing Swedish society’s propensity for tak-
ing risks to start businesses. This is evidenced
by the difficulties SMEs face in obtaining
financing and by the stringent employment reg-
ulations laid out in the 1976 Act on Security of
Employment.
Problems with Low Levels of
Entrepreneurship
Sweden has many large, domestically
owned companies that are major sources of
employment and government tax revenue. In
fact, nearly 60 percent of people working in the
industrial sector are employed at firms with at
least 200 employees. (“Swedish Industry,” p. 4)
Many of the country’s large firms, such as
Ericsson and Scandia, are smaller than their
international competitors, however; in recent
years these firms have realized that they must
expand their operations to foreign markets in
order to survive in the global marketplace.
Consequently, many of these firms have merged
with, or have been acquired by, foreign com-
petitors. 
Since the mid-1990s, inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) to Sweden has increased
seven-fold, positioning the country as the 11th
largest recipient of FDI in the world. (“Invest
in Sweden...,” p. 6) The increase is due, in large
part, to many cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A), such as the one that created
AstraZeneca. During the past ten years Sweden
has seen some of its largest multinationals fall
into foreign hands. These firms, and Swedish
firms in general, represent attractive targets to
the acquirers because of their developed tech-
nology, impressive productivity, and proximity
to the Baltic market. The M&A activity has cost
Sweden jobs, however, because the newly joined
companies, like AstraZeneca and Pfizer, often
prefer to move their headquarters and produc-
tion centers to countries where business costs
are lower. 
The cross-border M&A deals have result-
ed in the loss of many high-value-added jobs in
Sweden. For instance, in the late 1990s Astra
was performing poorly in terms of bringing new
products to market and was suffering because
of extremely high R&D costs. The only way to
ensure the survival of Astra was for it to merge
with another firm. Eventually, Zeneca proposed
a merger that was supported by several of
Astra’s large investors including Investor, which
controlled 12 percent of the voting shares. The
completed merger arguably saved Astra, but
many white-collar jobs were lost or transferred
to England where the merged firm’s corporate
headquarters was located. Sweden was hard hit,
having to bear 45 percent of the proposed job
cuts as part of the R&D restructuring effort.
(“AstraZeneca to Revamp...,” p. A22) 
The job losses associated with the flow of
FDI have prompted critics to raise issues simi-
lar to those recently faced by the Canadian gov-
ernment. For example, Gunderson and Verma
(p. 182) found that Canadians felt that their
country would lose control over the associated
jobs, that the investors would not be concerned
with the social issues involved in the countries
in which they have invested, and that the move-
ment of personnel from the investor’s country
to Canada would inhibit the development of key
Canadian personnel and entrepreneurial talent.
This attitude can also be seen in Sweden where
the FDI policy has been criticized because of the
closure of several facilities by their foreign par-
ent companies such as Sanmina-SCI Corp. and
the tire company Continental. (Starck)
This problem is becoming more serious
because Sweden, traditionally recognized for its
manufacturing sector, has seen these jobs come
under attack as well. Swedish firms looking to
lower their costs are moving manufacturing
operations and non-core functions, such as
information technology and call centers, off-
shore. As companies seek cost advantages,
Sweden looks less favorable as a base for com-
panies’ operations. Mike Marshall, a Senior
Lecturer in Economics at the University of East
London, claims that “private capital has increas-
ingly seen the traditional Swedish model
arrangements as no longer being compatible
with their best interests, and, with the lifting of
financial controls, Swedish firms have been able
to seek better profit margins (and lower labor
costs) elsewhere.” (Marshall, 1996) 
Although the country boasts corporate
taxes rates of 28 percent compared to 40 per-
cent in the U.S., there are sizable business costs,
due to stringent environmental and employ-
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ment laws, and high income taxes that are not
found in other countries. Thus, as firms con-
tinue to export parts of their operations,
Sweden is especially at risk of losing many jobs.
This is evidenced by the fact that as of 1997 only
one in three jobs within Sweden’s 80 largest
firms were located in the country. (Blomström
and Kokko, 2000, p. 77) 
As large firms continue to become foreign
owned or leave Sweden, there will be a lack of
firms to fill the gap left by the large corpora-
tions if SME development is not encouraged. It
should be noted that 84 percent of Sweden’s
fifty largest private corporations were founded
before 1945 and that none were founded after
1969. (Henrekson, p. 35) Thus, the impedi-
ments faced by SMEs need to be reduced so that
they can grow in size and fill the employment
void. If this does not happen, it will probably
become more difficult to maintain the welfare
state as Swedes know it today.
Many organizations, however, see the high
levels of FDI and the exportation of operations
as a good thing for Sweden. For example, the
Invest in Sweden Agency is calling for Sweden
“to maintain its course towards corporate
restructurings [and it] should not be derailed
by the recent spate of foreign-owned business
closures and consequent job losses.” (Starck)
The proponents of free FDI flows argue that this
strategy has been successful because it has
enabled many of Sweden’s corporations to
become major players in the international mar-
ket. Without this access to FDI, they doubt
whether some of these companies would have
survived in the face of international competi-
tion. Even if one agrees with this argument, the
Swedish workers displaced as a result of FDI or
job exportation will need alternative sources of
employment since the country’s large public
sector cannot indefinitely sustain increasing
numbers of employees on its payroll. Again,
Sweden needs to encourage private sector busi-
ness development but, as discussed below, there
are many hurdles faced by aspiring entrepre-
neurs. 
Burdens on Entrepreneurs
Sweden has a highly educated and highly
skilled workforce. Eighty-one percent of Swedes
have completed their secondary education, a
percentage which is higher than 16 of Sweden’s
European counterparts. The country’s invest-
ment in higher education, software, and R&D
as a percentage of GDP has earned Sweden the
distinction of being the most knowledge-based
economy in the world. (“Invest in Sweden...,”
p. 15) Additionally, its workforce generates the
third largest number of patents per capita.
(“Invest in Sweden...,” p. 23) 
Given the statistics above, one would think
that Sweden would be a highly entrepreneurial
country. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor,
however, ranks Sweden as having the seventh
lowest level of entrepreneurial activity out of
the thirty-seven countries studied. This dis-
crepancy in Sweden’s performance can be
explained by looking at the country’s industri-
al landscape and the country’s laws regarding
SMEs. 
Sweden is known for its world-renowned
brands such as Ericcson, Electrolux, and IKEA.
It is a “big-business” country where multina-
tionals employ 70 percent of industrial sector
employees. (“Swedish Industry,” p. 4) In the
past, the government neglected SMEs; instead,
it viewed the large corporations as the main
source of economic growth. In his study of
Swedish corporations, Marshall found that “the
development of the welfare state helped many
large Swedish companies like IKEA, and the tax
system undoubtedly favored the large corpora-
tions that made large investments and encour-
aged the already very strong trend towards con-
centration.” (Marshall, 1996) Recently, however,
the government has recognized entrepreneur-
ial activity as an engine of growth and compe-
tition. The government’s industry policies are
shifting slowly away from focusing solely on
large firms and, instead, aimed at supporting
SMEs. (Blomström and Kokko, 1995, p. 22) The
government has created organizations such as
NUTEK which assist in financing start-ups and
has several development programs to encour-
age collaboration among businesses. Although
these changes are taking place, the government
needs to take a more proactive approach to
ensure that the reforms happen quickly so that
displaced workers have more options than just
being employed by an already strained public
sector. The first major change has to be in the
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attitudes towards entrepreneurs because
Swedish culture, in general, does not recognize
the benefits that entrepreneurs bestow on 
society. 
Cultural Adverseness to Risk
Entrepreneurs are people who organize,
manage, and assume the risks of a business or
enterprise with the hope of generating a return
on their investment. They create wealth, which
is distributed among many people such as the
firm’s employees and suppliers while only a
small fraction of it is retained by the entrepre-
neur. (Legge and Hindle, p. 25) Although entre-
preneurs may only receive a small portion of
the wealth that they create, it may still be a
large amount relative to the wealth of the
majority of people in society. In the United
States, there are many examples of successful
entrepreneurs, such as Bill Gates, Sam Walton,
and Warren Buffet, who have benefited society
by creating jobs and wealth. Successful entre-
preneurs are generally regarded with disdain by
many Swedes, however, since they have tradi-
tionally regarded each other as equals. 
Many Swedes do not look favorably on
individuals who seek status through wealth
accumulation. In fact, the adverse entrepre-
neurial environment in Europe, which is appar-
ent in Sweden, stems partly from a cultural
misunderstanding of the benefits that entre-
preneurs can bring to a country. 
Financing Challenges
In a culture with deep-rooted feelings of
equality, such as Sweden’s, it is difficult for an
entrepreneur to justify his desire to start a busi-
ness. It is likely that in this environment, the
entrepreneur will face many obstacles even
before seeking funding for his idea. First, he
may have to convince his family and potential
employees that it is a good idea to leave a well-
paying, secure job in hopes of developing a suc-
cessful business. Then, even if the entrepreneur
were to gain the support of others, he still faces
the fundamental problem of raising money. 
The most common funding source in
early-stage companies is the entrepreneur’s
friends and family. A major impediment that
entrepreneurs face, however, is that the per-
sonal savings rate is very low in Sweden. In a
country where health care is “cradle to the
grave,” where education is paid for by the gov-
ernment, and where citizens receive numerous
social subsidies, the incentive to save money is
very low. In fact, from 1990–1997 Swedes saved
only 5.4 percent of their disposable income
while OECD Europe saved 10.9 percent.
(Henrekson, p. 12) Consequently, entrepre-
neurs in Sweden are hard-pressed to raise funds
from friends and family. Without the support of
these people, an entrepreneur must often aban-
don his idea or seek funding from outside
investors.
Swedish entrepreneurs are also at a dis-
advantage when raising capital from potential
lenders, such as banks, because they are hesi-
tant to lend to small businesses since they are
perceived to be high-risk borrowers. According
to the European Commission, the main reason
that banks will not lend to SMEs is that the
enterprises cannot provide enough collateral.
(“SMEs in Focus,” p. 7) This is especially true
when dealing with service businesses. These
businesses usually do not have as much collat-
eral as firms in other industries. For example,
a manufacturing firm might be able to present
capital equipment as collateral, but a service
firm is typically knowledge-intensive instead of
capital-intensive. Hence, bankers are less like-
ly to be satisfied with the offered collateral.
The point might be raised that since
Sweden has a strong venture capital industry,
the entrepreneur should seek funding from
venture capitalists (VC). VCs are important in
helping firms transition from the seed stage to
a more developed stage. This stage is the pre-
liminary phase in a company’s development
where the business plan is created and the man-
agement team assembled. (“Seed Stage
Financing,” p. 1) In this critical stage, the com-
pany needs money to develop its product ideas
and to attract employees. 
Swedish venture capital funding, howev-
er, comprises only a small amount of money
that goes into SMEs. In fact, early and seed
stage funding accounted for only 0.002 percent
of Sweden’s 1997 GDP compared to 0.045 per-
cent in the United States, and it primarily
focused on high-tech or high-growth indus-
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tries. (Cowie, p. 17) Additionally, with the
recent burst in the technology bubble, many
venture capitalists are avoiding seed stage
financing because of the high risks involved. In
fact, the Swedish Venture Capital Association
(SVCA) has found that Swedish seed funding
has decreased since 2001. This has led to the
call for fiscal incentives to promote the financ-
ing of these new businesses. (Berggren, p. 3)
Tax Laws
Swedish tax law also places small firms at
a disadvantage compared to large firms. During
most of the past 40 years, SMEs in Sweden have
had to pay a much higher tax rate than the large
corporations. SMEs cannot always use the same
tax strategies as larger firms since, in many
cases, they do not have subsidiaries to shift their
profits and losses in tax-minimizing ways.
(“Sweden: Foreign Investment”) 
Additionally, Sweden’s extremely high tax
rates make it difficult for businesses to attract
equity investors. Small firms rely heavily on
equity financing as a means of raising capital
since it is more feasible for an SME to give equi-
ty stakes in the business to investors than it is
to raise capital through debt financing.
According to Henrekson (p. 10), however, an
investment in 2001 by a household in a firm
that yielded a 10 percent pre-tax rate of return
was taxed at a marginal rate of 24.7 percent if
the investment was debt and 51.0 percent if it
was equity. This shows that Swedish tax law is
partial to debt financing as opposed to equity
financing. Large companies consequently have
an advantage compared to small firms because
they rely more heavily on debt financing.
Another tax hurdle faced by entrepreneurs
is the method by which stock options are taxed.
In Sweden, employee stock options are taxed as
wage income instead of as capital income. This
taxation method is similar to the one used in
the U.S., but income taxes are much lower in
the U.S. than in Sweden. In Sweden, options are
taxed at a rate of about 68 percent, whereas nor-
mal capital gains are taxed at 30 percent.
(Davidsson and Henrekson, p. 93) 
Options are attractive forms of compen-
sation, especially in rising equity markets, as
they benefit both the employer and the employ-
ee. The employer can provide the employee with
stock options in lieu of cash. Consequently, a
cash-strapped company can use its cash for
other purposes. The employee also benefits if
the company does well and goes public. His
stock options will rapidly appreciate and have
the potential to be worth much more than a
cash salary. Here again, the small firm is at a
disadvantage because large firms typically do
not rely as heavily on stock options. Because of
these tax laws, an entrepreneur is forced to
either forfeit larger equity stakes in his busi-
ness or provide less compensation to his
employees. 
Employment Laws
In addition to the tax disadvantages, entre-
preneurs in Sweden are confronted with strin-
gent labor laws meant to protect the largely
unionized workforce. In fact, as of 2001 approx-
imately 85 percent of blue-collar workers and
79 percent of white-collar workers were union-
ized. These are extremely high percentages
compared to those in countries with high lev-
els of entrepreneurship, such as the U.S., where
only 14 percent of non-farm wage earners are
unionized. 
The Swedish unions’ extensive member-
ship base has empowered them to be a domi-
nant force in the shaping of the country’s labor
laws. In 1976 the Swedish government, with the
help of organized labor, drafted the Act on
Security of Employment (LAS) to increase
employee rights and job security. This law
severely constrains Swedish employers in their
hiring and firing decisions; and although the
LAS affects all employers, it is particularly bur-
densome to SMEs as I explain below.
The law allows for termination because of
shortage of work, but it stipulates certain rules
which must be followed. For example, the LAS
requires that “in the event of notice of termi-
nation due to shortage of work the employer is
obliged to follow a special order of priority. This
entails priority for continued employment for
those who have been employed longest (the
‘first in, last out’ rule).” (“Facts and Figures...”)
If the market later rebounds and employers
need more workers, the LAS requires that
“employees who are dismissed with notice due
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to shortage of work have priority for re-employ-
ment for up to nine months after the termina-
tion of employment.” (“Facts and Figures...”)
This can be particularity damaging in the fast-
paced, high-technology industries where
employees add value when their knowledge is
current and applicable; the LAS, however,
makes it difficult to terminate employees when
their knowledge is obsolete. Instead of hiring
new talent, the SMEs must spend their
resources retraining existing employees. This
requirement is less burdensome for large cor-
porations that have developed training pro-
grams, but it is much more costly for SMEs. 
Although these laws seem good for the
workforce in general, they are somewhat short-
sighted. SMEs must be able to rapidly adjust
their workforces in response to changing mar-
ket conditions. The law protects employees in
the short-term, but it hampers the ability of
small businesses to compete and grow. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
In the early twentieth century, Sweden’s
policies encouraged innovation and small busi-
ness growth. This allowed such companies as
IKEA, Ericcson, and Electrolux to develop and
eventually become the multinational power-
houses that they are today. In the mid-twenti-
eth century, however, the business climate in
Sweden dramatically changed. The government
shifted its attention from nurturing small and
medium-sized businesses to focusing almost
completely on the country’s large firms. Today
SMEs do not have the available resources to
make the transition to large-sized firms. SMEs
could benefit from a reevaluation of the coun-
try’s tax and employment laws. The taxes on
equity financing could be lowered to encourage
investors to provide funding to entrepreneurs,
and the employment laws could also be restruc-
tured to allow SMEs to be dynamic and com-
petitive. 
While foreign investors’ interest in
Swedish firms is good in the sense that it allows
Sweden to remain competitive in the global
marketplace, it results in lost jobs within the
country. We have already seen this behavior
occur in the merger between Astra and Zeneca,
and Ford and Volvo, and the closings of sever-
al large foreign firms in Sweden.
The inflow of foreign capital into Sweden
is going to continue and there will be more lost
jobs. For this reason, the government should
institute policies that make the business cli-
mate more favorable for small and medium-
sized businesses. The first major change should
be in the attitudes towards entrepreneurs. Once
this change occurs, the changes needed in the
tax and employment laws would be likely to 
follow. 
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